Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving

Thomas Garcia (1) , Sébastien Massoni (2) , Marie Claire Villeval (1)

1 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
2 QuBE - School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology

A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. In a laboratory experiment, we show that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to behave less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation-rather than its benefits-are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.

Keywords: Ambiguity; excuse-driven behavior; charitable giving; social preferences

Domains: Economics and Finance

Thomas Garcia, Sébastien Massoni, Marie Claire Villeval. Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving. 2018. ⟨halshs-01934606⟩