Goal-oriented agents in a market

Ines Macho-Stadler (1) , David Pérez-Castrillo (1) , Nicolas Quérou (2)

1 UAB - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona = Autonomous University of Barcelona = Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona
2 CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier

We consider a market where \standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goalorented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payo (the \trigger") to fulll a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments..

Keywords: Goal-oriented agents; incentives; matching market

Domains: Economics and Finance; Humanities and Social Sciences

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolas Quérou. Goal-oriented agents in a market. 2020. ⟨hal-02901398⟩