Fair cost-sharing methods for the minimum spanning tree game

Abstract : We study the problem of sharing in a fair manner the cost of a service provided to a set of players in the context of Cooperative Game Theory. We introduice a new fairness measure capturing the dissatisfaction (or happiness) of each player and we propose two cost sharing methods minimizing the maximum or average dissatisfaction of the clients for the classical minimum spannig tree game.
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Submitted on : Sunday, July 19, 2009 - 10:33:32 PM
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Eric Angel, Evripidis Bampis, Lélia Blin, Laurent Gourvès. Fair cost-sharing methods for the minimum spanning tree game. Information Processing Letters, Elsevier, 2006, 100, pp.29--35. ⟨10.1016/j.ipl.2006.05.007⟩. ⟨hal-00341341⟩

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