Network Games under Strategic Complementarities

Mohamed Belhaj (1) , Yann Bramoullé (1, 2) , Frédéric Deroïan (1)

1 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
2 Department of Economics, Université Laval

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.

Mots clés: Bonacich Centrality; Network Games; Strategic Complementarities; Supermodular Games

Domaines: Economies et finances

Mohamed Belhaj, Yann Bramoullé, Frédéric Deroïan. Network Games under Strategic Complementarities. 2012. ⟨halshs-00793439⟩