PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATIVE VOTING
Résumé
According to Condorcet's jury theorem, informative voting
under majority rule leads to asymptotically efficient information aggregation:
As the jury size tends to infinity, the probability of a wrong decision goes to
zero. However, as is well-known by now, rational and privately informed voters
will condition their votes on being pivotal, and this may destroy their incentive
to vote informatively (according to their private information). We here restore
Condorcet's asymptotic efficiency result by way of modifying the aggregation
rule in such a way that (a) voters have an incentive to vote informatively and
(b) the collective decision is asymptotically efficient. The mechanism is an
ex-post randomization between majority rule applied to all votes and majority
rule applied to a randomly sampled subset of votes.
under majority rule leads to asymptotically efficient information aggregation:
As the jury size tends to infinity, the probability of a wrong decision goes to
zero. However, as is well-known by now, rational and privately informed voters
will condition their votes on being pivotal, and this may destroy their incentive
to vote informatively (according to their private information). We here restore
Condorcet's asymptotic efficiency result by way of modifying the aggregation
rule in such a way that (a) voters have an incentive to vote informatively and
(b) the collective decision is asymptotically efficient. The mechanism is an
ex-post randomization between majority rule applied to all votes and majority
rule applied to a randomly sampled subset of votes.
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