Image Schemas as Epistemic Feelings: The Shift from Cognitive to Affective Semantics
Abstract
The present article aims to revisit the concept of image schemas, as it has been traditionally defined in cognitive semantics, in light of the notion of epistemic feeling. I advocate the view that epistemic feelings-that is, affective states that express a definite form of cognizanceare good candidates for psychologically underpinning image-schematic structures and explaining the semantic processes in which they are involved, and I call for a paradigmatic shift from a "cognitive" to an "affective"-or, more exactly, "psychoaffective"-approach to linguistic meaning. After briefly presenting the notion of (psycho)affective semantics, I examine successively: (a) the idea that both image schemas and epistemic feelings are subjective and ubiquitous properties of the mind; (b) the experiential commonalities between image schemas and epistemic feelings as semantic factors (abstractness, typicality, epistemic immediacy, polar opposition); (c) the idea that epistemic feelings may be a unique means of psychologically grounding image schemas; (d) five significant types of epistemic feelings that may be involved in the making of image-schematic structures. The article proposes a new theoretical/epistemological perspective on image schemas and semantics, at the interface between linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and affective science.
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