The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs

Florian Navarro (1)

1 LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221

A cooperative game with transferable utility is a situation in which players can generate worth by cooperating and obtain a certain payoff via a sharing rule. In this paper we assume that the cooperation between players is restricted by an acyclic graph. We introduce a new sharing rule for this type of game. We also offer an axiomatization of this sharing rule, based mainly on linearity and a consistency axiom. For unanimity games, this sharing rule identifies the center of the graph.

Mots clés: game theory; cooperative games; graphs; associated consistency; centrality measures

Domaines: Informatique et théorie des jeux [cs.GT]; Economies et finances

Florian Navarro. The center value: A sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, 105, pp.1-13. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.02.001⟩. ⟨hal-03411527⟩