Robust communication on networks

Marie Laclau (1, 2, 3) , Ludovic Renou (4, 5) , Xavier Venel (6)

1 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
2 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
3 HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales
4 QMUL - Queen Mary University of London
5 University of Adelaide
6 LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma]

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distinct nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the receiver is thus indirect. We ask when it is possible to robustly implement the equilibrium outcomes of the direct communication game as equilibrium outcomes of indirect communication games on the network. Robust implementation requires that: (i) the implementation is independent of the preferences of the intermediaries and (ii) the implementation is guaranteed at all histories consistent with unilateral deviations by the intermediaries. We show that robust implementation of direct communication is possible if and only if either the sender and receiver are directly connected or there exist two disjoint paths between the sender and the receiver. We also show that having two disjoint paths between the sender and the receiver guarantees the robust implementation of all communication equilibria of the direct game. We use our results to reflect on organizational arrangements.

Mots clés: Cheap talk; direct; mediated; communication; protocol; network. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C72; D82

Domaines: Economies et finances

Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou, Xavier Venel. Robust communication on networks. 2021. ⟨hal-03099678v1⟩