Friet: an Authenticated Encryption Scheme with Built-in Fault Detection

Thierry Simon (1, 2) , Lejla Batina (3) , Joan Daemen (1) , Vincent Grosso (4, 5) , Pedro Maat Costa Massolino (1) , Kostas Papagiannopoulos (1) , Francesco Regazzoni (6) , Niels Samwel (1)

1 Radboud University [Nijmegen]
2 STMicroelectronics
3 Digital Security Group [Nijmegen]
4 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
5 LHC - Laboratoire Hubert Curien
6 Faculty of Informatics [Lugano]

In this work we present a duplex-based authenticated en-cryption scheme Friet based on a new permutation called Friet-P. We designed Friet-P with a novel approach for cryptographic permutations and block ciphers that takes fault-attack resistance into account and that we introduce in this paper. In this method, we build a permutation fC to be embedded in a larger one, f. First, we define f as a sequence of steps that all abide a chosen error-correcting code C, i.e., that map C-codewords to C-codewords. Then, we embed fC in f by first encoding its input to an element of C, applying f and then decoding back from C. This last step detects a fault when the output of f is not in C. We motivate the design of the permutation we use in Friet and report on performance in soft-and hardware. We evaluate the fault-detection capabilities of the software and simulated hardware implementations with attacks. Finally, we perform a leakage evaluation. Our code is available at https://github.com/thisimon/Friet.git.

Mots clés: lightweight implementations; design of cryptographic primitives; fault injection countermeasures; side channel attack

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Thierry Simon, Lejla Batina, Joan Daemen, Vincent Grosso, Pedro Maat Costa Massolino, et al.. Friet: an Authenticated Encryption Scheme with Built-in Fault Detection. Eurocrypt, May 2020, Zagreb, France. pp.581-611, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-45721-1_21⟩. ⟨hal-02893642⟩