A water agency faced with quantity-quality management of a groundwater resource

Katrin Erdlenbruch (1) , Mabel Tidball (2) , Georges Zaccour (3, 4)

1 UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages
2 LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
3 GERAD - Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherche en Analyse des Décisions
4 École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Montréal

We consider a problem of groundwater management in which a group of farmers over-exploits a groundwater stock and causes excessive pollution. A Water Agency wishes to regulate the famer's activity, in order to reach a minimum quantity and quality level but it is subject to a budget constraint and cannot credibly commit to time-dependent optimal policies. We construct a Stackelberg game to determine a set of constant policies that brings the groundwater resource back to the desired state. We define a set of conditions for which constant policies exist and compute the amount of these instruments in an example.

Mots clés: groundwater; Stackelberg game

Mots clés: constant policies; quantity-quality management

Domaines: Sciences de l'Homme et Société

Katrin Erdlenbruch, Mabel Tidball, Georges Zaccour. A water agency faced with quantity-quality management of a groundwater resource. 2012. ⟨hal-02805139⟩