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Game Theoretical Analysis of Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps
Abstract : In this paper we address the distributed cross-chain swap problem in the blockchain context where multiple agents exchange assets across multiple blockchain systems (e.g. trading Bitcoins for Litecoins or Ethers). We present a mathematical framework allowing to characterize blockchain swap protocols as the combination of a publishing and a commitment phase, where contracts are respectively published and then committed.
We characterize the equilibria of existing cross-chain swap protocols (i.e., blockchain swap protocols exchanging assets among different blockchains). More precisely, we prove that following a swap protocol characterized by concurrent publishing of exchange contracts and snap (immediate) assets transfers is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove that for protocols with a sequential publishing and commitment of the assets transfers, following the prescribed protocol is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Cited literature [43 references]
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02414356
Contributor : Marianna Belotti Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, April 29, 2020 - 6:00:50 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, March 16, 2022 - 3:50:23 AM
Contributor : Marianna Belotti Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, April 29, 2020 - 6:00:50 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, March 16, 2022 - 3:50:23 AM
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