Game theoretical analysis of Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps

Abstract : In this paper we address the distributed cross-chain swap problem in the blockchain context where multiple parties exchange assets across multiple blockchains (e.g. trading Bitcoins for Litecoins or Ethers). We present the first framework allowing to characterize the equilibria of existing cross-chain swap protocols. We prove that following a swap protocol characterized by concurrent publishing of exchange contracts and snap (immediate) assets transfers is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove that for protocols with sequential publishing and commitment of the assets transfers, following the prescribed protocol is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [43 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Marianna Belotti <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 20, 2020 - 6:43:40 PM
Last modification on : Sunday, February 23, 2020 - 1:24:02 AM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : hal-02414356, version 2


Marianna Belotti, Stefano Moretti, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Stefano Secci. Game theoretical analysis of Atomic Cross-Chain Swaps. [Research Report] Caisse des dépôts - Institut pour la recherche et Banque des territoires; CEDRIC laboratory, CNAM-Paris, France; Sorbonne Universites, UPMC University of Paris 6. 2019. ⟨hal-02414356v2⟩



Record views


Files downloads