Ceteris Paribus Majority for social ranking

Adrian Haret (1) , Hossein Khani (2) , Stefano Moretti (2) , Meltem Ozturk (2)

1 Technical University of Wien
2 LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision

We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an example.

Domaines: Informatique [cs]

Adrian Haret, Hossein Khani, Stefano Moretti, Meltem Ozturk. Ceteris Paribus Majority for social ranking. 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-ECAI-18), Jul 2018, Stockholm, Sweden. pp.303-309, ⟨10.24963/ijcai.2018/42⟩. ⟨hal-02103421⟩