Sender-receiver games with cooperation

Françoise Forges (1, 2) , Ulrich Horst (3, 4)

1 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision
2 LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine
3 Institut für Mathematik [Berlin]
4 HU Berlin - Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin = Humboldt University of Berlin = Université Humboldt de Berlin

We consider generalized sender–receiver games in which the sender also has an action to choose, but this action is payoff-relevant only to himself. We study “cooperate and talk” equilibria (CTE) in which, before sending his message, the sender can commit to delegate his decision to the receiver. CTE are beneficial to the receiver (with respect to no communication) and unlike the equilibria of the plain cheap talk game, preserve him from afterwards regret. While existence of CTE cannot be guaranteed in general, a sufficient condition is that the receiver has a “uniform punishment decision” against the sender.

Mots clés: Cheap talk; Commitment; Incentive compatibility; Information transmission; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Domaines: Économie et finance quantitative [q-fin]

Françoise Forges, Ulrich Horst. Sender-receiver games with cooperation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2018, 76, ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002⟩. ⟨hal-02313962⟩