The stickiness of norms

Abstract : In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02110601
Contributor : Isabelle Celet <>
Submitted on : Thursday, April 25, 2019 - 2:37:37 PM
Last modification on : Friday, April 26, 2019 - 1:35:30 AM

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Katherine Farrow, Rustam Romaniuc. The stickiness of norms. International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2019, 58, pp.54-62. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010⟩. ⟨hal-02110601⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

34