Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

David Martimort (1, 2) , Jérôme Pouyet (3, 4, 5) , Francesco Ricci (6, 7, 8)

1 PSE - Paris School of Economics
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications
4 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
5 ESSEC Business School
6 CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010
7 UM - Université de Montpellier
8 UMR ART-Dev - Acteurs, Ressources et Territoires dans le Développement

We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.

Mots clés: Non-Renewable Resource Management; Delegated Management; Optimal Contract; Asymmetric Information

Domaines: Economies et finances

David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet, Francesco Ricci. Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, 132, pp.81. ⟨10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081⟩. ⟨hal-02057380⟩