Public, Private and Non-Profit Regulation for Environmental Quality

Lucie Bottega (1, 2) , Jenny de Freitas (3)

1 LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
2 Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier
3 UAB - Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona = Autonomous University of Barcelona = Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona

This paper studies the welfare implications of different institutions certifying environmental quality supplied by a monopoly. The monopolist can voluntarily certify the quality of the product through an eco-label provided either by an NGO or a for-proft private certifier (PC). The NGO and the PC may use advertisement to promote the label. We compare the NGO and PC regimes with the regime where the regulator imposes a minimum quality standard. The presence of a private certifier in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green advertisement reinforces the above result.

Mots clés: environmental quality; green advertisement; ngo; self-regulation

Mots clés: certification

Domaines: Economies et finances

Lucie Bottega, Jenny de Freitas. Public, Private and Non-Profit Regulation for Environmental Quality. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2009, 18 (1), pp.105-123. ⟨10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00209.x⟩. ⟨hal-02054487⟩