Auction mechanisms for Licensed Shared Access: reserve prices and revenue-fairness tradeoffs

Ayman Chouayakh 1 Aurelien Bechler 2 Isabel Amigo 3, 4 Loutfi Nuaymi 1, 4 Patrick Maillé 5, 1, 6
4 ADOPNET - Advanced technologies for operated networks
UR1 - Université de Rennes 1, IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire, IRISA_D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES
5 OCIF - Objets communicants pour l'Internet du futur
IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire, IRISA_D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES
6 DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS
Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA_D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES
Abstract : Licensed shared access (LSA) is a new approach that allows Mobile Network Operators to use a portion of the spectrum initially licensed to another incumbent user, by obtaining a license from the regulator via an auction mechanism. In this context, diierent truthful auction mechanisms have been proposed, and diier in terms of allocation (who gets the spectrum) but also on revenue. Since those mechanisms could generate an extremely low revenue, we extend them by introducing a reserve price per bidder which represents the minimum amount that each winning bidder should pay. Since this may be at the expense of the allocation fairness, for each mechanism we nd by simulation the reserve price that optimizes a trade-oo between expected fairness and expected revenue. Also, for each mechanism, we analytically express the expected revenue when valuations of operators for the spectrum are independent and identically distributed from a uniform distribution.
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Auction theory. 2018
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01883697
Contributeur : Ayman Chouayakh <>
Soumis le : vendredi 28 septembre 2018 - 15:08:52
Dernière modification le : lundi 15 octobre 2018 - 16:14:01

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Ayman Chouayakh, Aurelien Bechler, Isabel Amigo, Loutfi Nuaymi, Patrick Maillé. Auction mechanisms for Licensed Shared Access: reserve prices and revenue-fairness tradeoffs. Auction theory. 2018. 〈hal-01883697〉

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