Nash equilibria in symmetric graph games with partial observation

Nicolas Markey (1, 2, 3) , Patricia Bouyer (2) , Steen Vester (4)

1 IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires
2 LSV - Laboratoire Spécification et Vérification [Cachan]
3 SUMO - SUpervision of large MOdular and distributed systems
4 DTU - Danmarks Tekniske Universitet = Technical University of Denmark

We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria for qualitative objectives in this game model.

Mots clés: Games on graphs; Network of systems; Symmetry; Nash equilibrium

Domaines: Logique en informatique [cs.LO]; Théorie et langage formel [cs.FL]; Système multi-agents [cs.MA]; Informatique et théorie des jeux [cs.GT]

Nicolas Markey, Patricia Bouyer, Steen Vester. Nash equilibria in symmetric graph games with partial observation. Information and Computation, 2017, 254, pp.238 - 258. ⟨10.1016/j.ic.2016.10.010⟩. ⟨hal-01633415⟩