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Network games under strategic complementarities

Abstract : We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for uniqueness, covering all concave as well as some non-concave best responses. We then study the relationship between position and action and identify situations where a more central agent always plays a higher action in equilibrium. We finally analyze comparative statics. We show that a shock may not propagate throughout the entire network and uncover a general pattern of decreasing interdependence.
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Submitted on : Thursday, November 29, 2018 - 1:16:49 PM
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Mohamed Moez Belhaj, Yann Bramoullé, Frédéric Deroïan. Network games under strategic complementarities. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2014, 88 (C), pp.310--319. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.009⟩. ⟨hal-01474250⟩



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