A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games

Sylvain Béal (1) , Eric Rémila (2) , Philippe Solal (2)

1 CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190)
2 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne

A new class of allocation rules combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of allocation rules such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole class of allocation rules, and one of each of its extreme points.

Mots clés: TU-games; Solidarity; null player; Egalitarian Shapley value; Procedural values

Domaines: Informatique et théorie des jeux [cs.GT]; Microstructure des marchés [q-fin.TR]

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal. A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games. 2015. ⟨hal-01376906⟩