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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2011

An overview of a proof-based approach to detecting C vulnerabilities

Résumé

This paper gives an overview of a formal approach for detecting vulnerabilities in C programs using the B formal method. Vulnerabilities denote faults that may be introduced unintentionally into programs making them behave incorrectly. Such faults (or programing errors) may lead to unpredictable behavior and even worse well-motivated attackers may exploit them later to cause real damages. Basically, the proposed approach consists in translating the vulnerable aspects of a C program into a B specification. On this B specification proof and model checking activities are performed in order to detect the presence or absence of vulnerabilities. Compared to the existing vulnerability detection techniques, a proof-based approach permits to eliminate false alarms and denial of service attacks
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Dates et versions

hal-01303015 , version 1 (15-04-2016)

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Citer

Amel Mammar. An overview of a proof-based approach to detecting C vulnerabilities. SAC 2011 : 26th Symposium on Applied Computing, Mar 2011, Taichung, Taiwan. pp.1343 - 1344, ⟨10.1145/1982185.1982476⟩. ⟨hal-01303015⟩
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