Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Jean-François Caulier (1) , Ana Mauleon (2, 3) , Vincent Vannetelbosch (2, 3)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
3 CEREC - Centre de recherche en économie

Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.

Keywords: allocation rules; Coalition; Networks; cooperative game theory

Domains: Economics and Finance

Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch. Allocation rules for coalitional network games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 78, pp.80-88. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.003⟩. ⟨hal-01301981⟩