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Method Taking into Account Process Dispersions to Detect Hardware Trojan Horse by Side-Channel

Abstract : Hardware trojan horses inserted in integrated circuits have received special attention of researchers. Most of the recent researches focus on detecting the presence of hardware trojans through various techniques like reverse engineering, test/verification methods and side-channel analysis (SCA). Previous works using SCA for trojan detection are based on power measurements or even simulations. When using real silicon, the results are strongly biased by the process variations, the exact size of the trojan and its location. In this paper, we propose a metric to measure the impact of these parameters. For the first time, we give the detection probability of a trojan as a function of its activity, even if untriggered. Moreover we use electromagnetic (EM) as side-channel as it provides a better spatial and temporal resolution than power measurements. We conduct a proof of concept study using an AES-128 cryptographic core running on a set of 10 Virtex-5 FPGA. Our results show that, using this metric, there is a probability superior than 99% with a false negative rate of 0.017% to detect a HT bigger than 1% of the original circuit.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, December 8, 2015 - 8:37:26 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, March 23, 2022 - 10:18:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, April 29, 2017 - 10:21:18 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01240241, version 1



Xuan Thuy Ngo, Zakaria Najm, Shivam Bhasin, Sylvain Guilley, Jean-Luc Danger. Method Taking into Account Process Dispersions to Detect Hardware Trojan Horse by Side-Channel. PROOFS: Security Proofs for Embedded Systems 2014, Sep 2014, BUSAN, South Korea. ⟨hal-01240241⟩



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