Peering Equilibrium MultiPath Routing: a game theory framework for Internet peering settlements

Stefano Secci 1 Jean-Louis Rougier Achille Pattavina Fioravante Patrone Guido Maier
1 Phare
LIP6 - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris 6
Abstract : It is generally admitted that interdomain peering links represent nowadays the main bottleneck of the Internet, particularly because of lack of coordination between providers, which use independent and “selfish” routing policies. We are interested in identifying possible “light” coordination strategies that would allow carriers to better control their peering links while preserving their independence and respective interests. We propose a robust multipath routing coordination framework for peering carriers, which relies on the multiple-exit discriminator (MED) attribute of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) as signaling medium. Our scheme relies on a game theory modeling, with a non-cooperative potential game considering both routing and congestions costs. Peering equilibrium multipath (PEMP) coordination policies can be implemented by selecting Pareto-superior Nash equilibria at each carrier. We compare different PEMP policies to BGP Multipath schemes by emulating a realistic peering scenario. Our results show that the routing cost can be decreased by roughly 10% with PEMP. We also show that the stability of routes can be significantly improved and that congestion can be practically avoided on the peering links. Finally, we discuss practical implementation aspects and extend the model to multiple players highlighting the possible incentives for the resulting extended peering framework.
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Stefano Secci, Jean-Louis Rougier, Achille Pattavina, Fioravante Patrone, Guido Maier. Peering Equilibrium MultiPath Routing: a game theory framework for Internet peering settlements. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, IEEE/ACM, 2011, 19 (2), pp.419-432. ⟨10.1109/TNET.2010.2062535⟩. ⟨hal-01167765⟩



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