Compact preference representation and Boolean games

Élise Bonzon , Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex (1) , Jérôme Lang (2) , Bruno Zanuttini (3)

1 IRIT-ADRIA - Argumentation, Décision, Raisonnement, Incertitude et Apprentissage
2 IRIT - Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse
3 Equipe MAD - Laboratoire GREYC - UMR6072

Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical in- teractions between agents. Boolean games[23, 22] yield a compact rep- resentation of 2-player zero-sum static games with binary preferences: an agent's strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player's preferences are expressed by a plain propositional formula. These restrictions (2-player, zero-sum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. We first generalize the framework to n-player games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple char- acterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the associated problems. Then, we relax the last restriction by coupling Boolean games with a representation, namely,CP-nets.

Domains: Machine Learning [cs.LG]

Élise Bonzon, Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex, Jérôme Lang, Bruno Zanuttini. Compact preference representation and Boolean games. Automous Agents and Multi-Agents Systems, 2009, 18, pp.1--35. ⟨hal-00947826⟩