A Formal Proof of Countermeasures Against Fault Injection Attacks on CRT-RSA

Abstract : In this article, we describe a methodology that aims at either breaking or proving the security of CRT-RSA implementations against fault injection attacks. In the specific case-study of the BellCoRe attack, our work bridges a gap between formal proofs and implementation-level attacks. We apply our results to three implementations of CRT-RSA, namely the unprotected one, that of Shamir, and that of Aumüller et al. Our findings are that many attacks are possible on both the unprotected and the Shamir implementations, while the implementation of Aumüller et al. is resistant to all single-fault attacks. It is also resistant to double-fault attacks if we consider the less powerful threat-model of its authors.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer, 2013, pp.1-13. 〈10.1007/s13389-013-0065-3〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [25 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00863914
Contributeur : Pablo Rauzy <>
Soumis le : vendredi 31 janvier 2014 - 14:00:14
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:23:38
Document(s) archivé(s) le : dimanche 9 avril 2017 - 03:53:40

Fichiers

proofs_jcen.pdf
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Identifiants

Citation

Pablo Rauzy, Sylvain Guilley. A Formal Proof of Countermeasures Against Fault Injection Attacks on CRT-RSA. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer, 2013, pp.1-13. 〈10.1007/s13389-013-0065-3〉. 〈hal-00863914v2〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

502

Téléchargements de fichiers

203