The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria

Yannick Viossat (1)

1 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision

It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.

Mots clés: Replicator dynamics; Correlated equilibrium; Rock-Paper-Scissors

Domaines: Analyse classique [math.CA]; Economies et finances

Yannick Viossat. The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, pp.397-407. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001⟩. ⟨hal-00664293⟩