Let's not Argue over EU Policies: The Case of Wine Reform
Résumé
Since the politicization of the EU's 'democratic deficit' began in the early 1990s, research has paid considerable attention to formal mechanisms for European-scale deliberation (e.g. the European Parliament or the European Convention). However, has this social science been looking for EU deliberation in the right place? Given that most of the EU's government takes place within sectors, this article instead applies Risse's lens on deliberation to investigating one of these venues of politics. Using findings from a process-tracing of the radical reform of the EU's regulation of its wine industry in 2008, it claims that despite a recent shift within the Commission to present its arguments more 'transparently', deliberation remained stifled by anticipations of interest group and member state resistance. More generally, the case study is used to show that although Commission consultation procedures are now consistently structured by the procedures of 'Better Regulation', these are still driven by calculations of consequences for Council negotiations rather than by a principled commitment to open argument and change through persuasion.