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Article Dans Une Revue Social Choice and Welfare Année : 2013

Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results

Résumé

This paper deals with the existence of anonymous mechanisms to realize the Lindahl correspondence. We consider, in turn, constant and decreasing returns to scale technologies for producing public goods. In each case, we provide a continuous (but not smooth) and weakly balanced mechanism, which meets the two conditions. We then remark that they satisfy a property (see property NC), which is related to, but in fact stronger than anonymity. Finally, we prove that if a mechanism has this property, if it is weakly balanced and implements the Lindahl correspondence, then it cannot be differentiable around Nash equilibria.

Dates et versions

hal-00798338 , version 1 (08-03-2013)

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Sébastien Rouillon. Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results. Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 40 (40), pp.1179-1203. ⟨10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6⟩. ⟨hal-00798338⟩

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