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Article Dans Une Revue Economic Letters Année : 2006

Work Incentives and Household Insurance: Sequential Contracting with Altruistic Individuals and Moral Hazard

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hal-00151788 , version 1 (05-06-2007)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00151788 , version 1

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Cécile Aubert. Work Incentives and Household Insurance: Sequential Contracting with Altruistic Individuals and Moral Hazard. Economic Letters, 2006, 92, pp.82-88. ⟨hal-00151788⟩

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