Existence theorems for generalized Nash equilibrium problems: an analysis of assumptions

Christophe Dutang (1, 2)

1 SAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financière
2 IRMA - Institut de Recherche Mathématique Avancée

The generalized Nash equilibrium, where the feasible sets of the players depend on other players' action, becomes increasingly popular among academics and practitionners. In this paper, we provide a thorough study of theorems guaranteeing existence of generalized Nash equilibria and analyze the assumptions on practical parametric feasible sets.

Mots clés: Noncooperative games; Existence theorem; Nash equilibrium

Domaines: Optimisation et contrôle [math.OC]

Christophe Dutang. Existence theorems for generalized Nash equilibrium problems: an analysis of assumptions. 2013. ⟨hal-00828948v1⟩