Bayesian Repeated Games

Francoise Forges (1, 2) , Antoine Salomon (3)

1 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision
2 LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine
3 LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne

We consider Bayesian games, with independent private values, in which uniform punishment strategies are available. We establish that the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff equivalent to tractable separating (i.e., completely revealing) equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. We also show, on a public good example, that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become infinitely patient, do exist.

Mots clés: infinitely repeated game; public good; Bayesian game; incentive compatibility; independent private values; individual rationality

Domaines: Economies et finances

Francoise Forges, Antoine Salomon. Bayesian Repeated Games. 2013. ⟨hal-00803919v3⟩