In Search of Lost Nudges

Guilhem Lecouteux (1)

1 X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique

This paper discusses the validity of nudges to tackle time-inconsistent behaviours. I show that libertarian paternalism is grounded on a peculiar model of personal identity, and that the argument according to which nudges may improve one's self-assessed well-being can be seriously questioned. I show that time inconsistencies do not necessarily reveal that the decision maker is irrational: they can also be the result of discounting over the degree of psychological connectedness between our successive selves rather than over time (Parfit 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press). Time inconsistency can call for paternalism if and only if we accept that an individual is characterised by stable " true " preferences over time-dependent outcomes, and that she is rationally required to make time-consistent choices. This model is descriptively and normatively questionable. I then argue that behavioural findings may still justify paternalistic interventions, but on a non-welfarist basis.

Mots clés: nudges; libertarian paternalism; Parfit; hyperbolic discounting; identity; psychological connectedness

Domaines: Economies et finances; Philosophie

Guilhem Lecouteux. In Search of Lost Nudges. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2015, Nudge, 6 (3), pp.397 - 408. ⟨10.1007/s13164-015-0265-0⟩. ⟨halshs-01426493⟩