The Value of Mediated Communication - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2016

The Value of Mediated Communication

Résumé

This paper characterizes optimal communication equilibria (which models mediation) in sender-receiver games. We assume that communication devices are designed to maximize the ex-ante welfare of the informed party (i.e., the sender). Communication equilibria are defined by a set of linear incentive constraints. The associated dual variables of these constraints yield shadow prices that are used to get “virtual utility functions” that intuitively characterize the signaling costs of incentive compatibility. A key result is a characterization of the value of an optimal communication equilibrium (value of mediation) from the concavification of the sender’s indirect virtual utility function over prior beliefs. Using this result we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a communication equilibrium to be optimal. An additional result establishes a bound on the number of messages that the sender needs to convey in order to achieve the value of mediation.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Value of Mediated Communication.pdf (344.14 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-01289379 , version 1 (16-03-2016)
hal-01289379 , version 2 (05-07-2016)
hal-01289379 , version 3 (12-12-2016)
hal-01289379 , version 4 (01-09-2017)
hal-01289379 , version 5 (22-08-2019)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01289379 , version 5

Citer

Andrés Salamanca. The Value of Mediated Communication. 2016. ⟨hal-01289379v5⟩
828 Consultations
927 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More