Some Probability Judgments may Rely on Complexity Assessments

Abstract : Human beings do assess probabilities. Their judgments are however sometimes at odds with probability theory. One possibility is that human cognition is imperfect or flawed in the probability domain, showing biases and errors. Another possibility, that we explore here, is that human probability judgments do not rely on a weak version of probability calculus, but rather on complexity computations. This hypothesis is worth exploring, not only because it predicts some of the probability ‘biases’, but also because it explains human judgments of uncertainty in cases where probability calculus cannot be applied. We designed such a case in which the use of complexity when judging uncertainty is almost transparent.
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Communication dans un congrès
Noelle, D. C., Dale, R., Warlaumont, A. S., Yoshimi, J., Matlock, T., Jennings, C. D., & Maglio, P. P. (Eds.). CogSci 2015, Jul 2015, Pasadena, California, United States. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society., Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society., pp.2069-2074, 2015
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01196802
Contributeur : Antoine Saillenfest <>
Soumis le : jeudi 10 septembre 2015 - 14:17:12
Dernière modification le : vendredi 11 septembre 2015 - 01:05:19

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  • HAL Id : hal-01196802, version 1

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Antoine Saillenfest, Jean-Louis Dessalles. Some Probability Judgments may Rely on Complexity Assessments. Noelle, D. C., Dale, R., Warlaumont, A. S., Yoshimi, J., Matlock, T., Jennings, C. D., & Maglio, P. P. (Eds.). CogSci 2015, Jul 2015, Pasadena, California, United States. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society., Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society., pp.2069-2074, 2015. <hal-01196802>

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