Distribution of the savings induced by the sharing of demand information in supply chains

Abstract : In this paper, we study the distribution of the savings incurred by the sharing of demand information. Specifically, we investigate how savings occur depending on the considered position in the supply chain, viz. retailer or wholesaler. For that purpose, we simulate a spreadsheet implementation of a version of the Beer Game with two companies when market demand is a normal distribution. The companies may use one of three ordering strategies: () no information sharing, () point-to-point information sharing and () information sharing by information centralisation. We discuss what would be an ideal ordering strategy in the Beer Game. Finally, we look for the Nash equilibria in our model and conclude that the company sharing the demand information has the benefits of having a lower and more stable inventory level.
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Conference papers
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00367659
Contributor : Armand Baboli <>
Submitted on : Thursday, March 12, 2009 - 9:17:27 AM
Last modification on : Friday, November 30, 2018 - 2:24:01 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-00367659, version 1

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Thierry Moyaux, Armand Baboli. Distribution of the savings induced by the sharing of demand information in supply chains. International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain, May 2008, Madison-Wisconsin, United States. pp.548-559. ⟨hal-00367659⟩

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