The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein

Timur Cengiz Uçan (1)

1 SPH - Sciences, Philosophie, Humanités

This paper consists in a comparative study of the notions of negative fact in the early works of Russell and Wittgenstein. How to account for our ability to think both that it is false that what is not the case is the case and incorrect to think that it is true that what is not the case is the case? Are the truth and the correctness of such thoughts and of their expressions meant to be insured by the existence of negative facts? Or do we need to think of negative facts differently? In his early works, Russell argues not only that negative facts exist, but also that the philosophical problem they suffice to solve is real. While in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein dissolves the philosophical problem by letting the superfluity and misleadingness of the affirmation of the existence of negative facts be seen as such.

Mots clés: Negative Fact; Wittgenstein; Russell

Domaines: Philosophie

Timur Cengiz Uçan. The Notion of Negative Fact in the Early Works of Russell and Wittgenstein. 100 Years Tractatus: 44th International Symposium of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Aug 2023, Kirchberg am Wechsel, France. ⟨hal-04360112⟩