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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Année : 2010

Technology Choice, Relative Performance Pay, and Worker Heterogeneity

Résumé

We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance pay: If workers' abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly increase each worker.s productivity. Due to the complementarity between ability and technology, under technology adoption the productivity of a more able worker increases more strongly than the productivity of a less able colleague. As a consequence, both workers' motivation to exert effort is reduced. We show that this adverse incentive effect is dominant and, consequently, keeps the firm from introducing a better production technology if talent uncertainty is sufficiently high and/or monitoring of workers is sufficiently precise.
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Dates et versions

hal-00911828 , version 1 (30-11-2013)

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Matthias Kräkel, Anja Schöttner. Technology Choice, Relative Performance Pay, and Worker Heterogeneity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2010, 76 (3), pp.748. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.016⟩. ⟨hal-00911828⟩

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