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| HAL : hal-00607075, version 1 |
| DOI : 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.039 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Récupérer au format |
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| Economics Letters 94, 2 (2007) 240-244 |
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| Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives |
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| Pierre Fleckinger 1, 2 |
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| (02/2007) |
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| It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives. |
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| 1 : | Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES) |
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CNRS : UMR8174 – Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne |
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| 2 : | Paris School of Economics |
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Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne |
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| Domaine | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances |
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| Informed Principal – Countervailing Incentives – Risk Neutrality |
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| Liste des fichiers attachés à ce document : | |||||
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| hal-00607075, version 1 | |
| http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00607075 | |
| oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00607075 | |
| Contributeur : Pierre Fleckinger | |
| Soumis le : Mercredi 16 Novembre 2011, 18:27:15 | |
| Dernière modification le : Vendredi 25 Novembre 2011, 08:56:44 | |
