No-information secretary problems with cardinal payoffs and Poisson arrivals

Elżbieta Z. Ferenstein , Anna Krasnosielska

No-information secretary problem with Poisson stream of applicants is considered. The values of the applicants are random variables drawn from uniform distribution. The goal is to maximize the expectation of the value of the applicant under the condition that the decision maker can only stop on a candidate best so far. We also consider two modifications of this problem.

Mots clés: Physical Sciences

Elżbieta Z. Ferenstein, Anna Krasnosielska. No-information secretary problems with cardinal payoffs and Poisson arrivals. Statistics and Probability Letters, 2009, 80 (3-4), pp.221. ⟨10.1016/j.spl.2009.10.010⟩. ⟨hal-00602313⟩