Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay

Bernard Steunenberg (1)

1 Universiteit Leiden = Leiden University

Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to adopt national policies implementing directives. In this paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordination of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordination is approached as a game in which one or more higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the transposition process, the implementing policy differs from the policy specified by the directive. However, a decisionmaking process with more than one higher-level player can result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a directive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illustrated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the framework developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of transposition.

Mots clés: domestic players; EU policy process; national policy coordination; transposition

Bernard Steunenberg. Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay. European Union Politics, 2006, 7 (3), pp.293-319. ⟨10.1177/1465116506066258⟩. ⟨hal-00571730⟩