Configurations structurelles et options d’extensions des systèmes de permis d’émissions négociables

Abstract : Most countries recognize that a coordinated worldwide action to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has to be implemented. However, the countries inability to coordinate their efforts led to the failure of the top-down climate architecture. Today, the international climate governance adopts a different direction, which based on bottom-up approach. This approach promotes polycentric and multi-level governances, that induce several independent policy-makers in different administrative scales (province, state and region). Therefore, the actual implemented Emission Trading Systems (ETS), as well as the emerging ones, grow in a domestic context. This context, in terms of economic development, political commitment and geographical coverage, determine the ETS design. Then, there is no harmonized design among ETS, no universal diffusion of these mechanisms in the world and a lack of integral inclusion of all sectors in these carbon markets. While researchers and policy-makers discuss the optimal features of such systems, this thesis examines different configuration options and coverage areas for the tradable permit schemes.Using a world energy-economy partial equilibrium simulation model (POLES) and drawing on experiences with real-world ETSs (based on empirical literature), we recommend two types of adjustments: the restrictions on trade permits between sectors, in one hand, and the control of international permit exchange between ETS, in the second hand. Indeed, we demonstrate firstly the necessity to separate ETS by sector and adapt them considering the specificities of each sector. This kind of policy will stimulate innovation in each sector. Also, it will limit the impacts on the international competitiveness and it will lead climate policy to other economic policies. Secondly, we develop a model to describe the effects of exchange permits emissions considering international linking among emissions trading systems. We prove that restriction exchange mechanisms are necessary to insure the redistribution of exchange gain compared to full linking. At the same time, these trade restriction mechanisms minimize the total cost and increase GHG emissions reductions compared to a segmented market.Considering the diversity of national political objectives and the bottom-up context of world climate framework, we concluded that the coexistence of several carbon prices is unavoidable and necessary. Encouraging the development of several carbon prices can promote political acceptability, strengthen environmental efficiency and improve economic efficiency.
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Wilfried Mourier. Configurations structurelles et options d’extensions des systèmes de permis d’émissions négociables. Economies et finances. Université Grenoble Alpes, 2018. Français. ⟨NNT : 2018GREAE002⟩. ⟨tel-01871769v3⟩

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