ROLE DES CONFLITS D'AGENCE, DE LA STRUCTURE D'ACTIONNARIAT ET DES MECANISMES DE GOUVERNANCE SUR LES POLITIQUES DE DISTRIBUTION : APPLICATION AUX DECISIONS DE DIVIDENDE ET DE RACHAT D'ACTIONS DES SOCIETES FRANÇAISES COTEES.

Abstract : The dissertation aims at better understanding shareholder payout policies in the framework of the agency theory and to explain the choice of the payout tool: dividend or share repurchase. Taking into account the ownership structure of European firms, the classical conceptual framework was extended to a broader study of the influence of agency relationships between managers and shareholders, as well as between majority and minority shareholders. Such an analysis requires taking into account both factors influencing agency conflicts and the firm’s governance system. An empirical study of French companies listed on the SBF250 allows to illustrate the relevance of the conceptual framework and to highlight the limits of payout policies to resolve agency conflicts in France. While payout is used to reduce Free Cash Flow risk, its use is limited in a conflict situation between majority and minority shareholders. Without any efficient alternative governance mechanisms, minority shareholders cannot urge insiders to pay out. Thus the majority shareholders are free to reduce payout and to draw private benefits. The thesis also looks into the choice of the payout tool. In accordance with the various hypotheses stemming from literature survey, a major finding is that share repurchase is preferred when managers have stock-options or when firms’ earnings are temporary. Another key finding is that taxes do not influence in a significant way the choice of the payout tool. Eventually, it is stressed that share repurchase is not often used in France for payout, and that dividend remains the main tool.
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01276596
Contributor : Céline Du Boys <>
Submitted on : Friday, February 19, 2016 - 4:19:38 PM
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Céline Du Boys. ROLE DES CONFLITS D'AGENCE, DE LA STRUCTURE D'ACTIONNARIAT ET DES MECANISMES DE GOUVERNANCE SUR LES POLITIQUES DE DISTRIBUTION : APPLICATION AUX DECISIONS DE DIVIDENDE ET DE RACHAT D'ACTIONS DES SOCIETES FRANÇAISES COTEES. . Gestion et management. Université Aix Marseille (ex Université Paul CEZANNE (Aix Marseille III)), 2007. Français. ⟨tel-01276596⟩

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