. Ensuite, le processus en espace utilisateur est tout à fait capable de réaliser les traitements dans le cas d'autres systèmes. Notre approche a montré son efficacité pour formaliser des modèles de protection dynamique

. De and . Est-très-adaptée-puisque-le-contrôle-des-activités-est-entièrement-dynamique, Il est donc envisageable de définir différents modèles de protection dynamique adaptée à des contextes particuliers Nous avons proposé un nouveau modèle Mais il est tout à fait possible d'en définir de nouveaux pour supporter d'autres usages Notre approche est applicable à l'analyse de programmes ou d'activités malicieuses. C'est ce que nous avons montré dans le cadre du pot de miel client. Il semble possible d'élargir cette approche pour qu'elle puisse être intégrée dans le cadre de laboratoires d'analyse virologique. Dans ce cadre, nous pourrions fournir un environnement d'exécution contrôlé pour les virus, qui permette à la fois d'empêcher la propagation des virus tout en les caractérisant par leur impact sur le système au moyen de nos propriétés de sécurité. Ainsi, non seulement

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. Il-y-aura-rupture-de-la-propriété, une de ces régles n'est pas respectée Un niveau d'intégrité est défini pour chaque contexte. Dans notre modélisation, le niveau d'intégrité a pour forme un label supplémentaire sur chaque contexte Afin de faciliter l'utilisation des niveaux d'intégrité, nous introduisons une fonction int(cs) qui retourne le niveau d'intégrité du contexte : int : CS ? N. Les niveaux d'intégrité sont fixés par l'administrateur, Nous utilisons la fonction int() ainsi que les trois régles de Biba pour modéliser la propriété