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. Graphique-3, Impacts des catégories de risques sur l'importance de la réduction de la performance technique pour la DGA

. Graphique-3, Les déterminants des risques contractuels intervenus lors de la négociation ou l

. Graphique-3, Les déterminants des risques contractuels intervenus lors de la mise en oeuvre des marchés

A. Graphique, 1 : Les déterminants du risque technologique, p.311

A. Graphique, Les déterminants critiques du risque technologique, p.313

A. Graphique, Les déterminants de la défaillance du titulaire conduisant à la matérialisation du risque industriel, p.315

A. Graphique, Les déterminants de la défaillance de la sous-traitance conduisant à la matérialisation du risque industriel, p.316

A. Graphique, Les déterminants critiques du risque industriel, p.317

A. Graphique, 8 : Les responsabilités de la réduction des ressources financières, p.319

A. Graphique, 10 : Les déterminants critiques du risque financier direct, p.321

. La-concurrence-au, 1 er niveau : un objectif sous contraintes, p.50