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?. Let-u and I. St, Thus there exists f ? F ? E such that u ? st(f ) By Lemma 26, we know that vars(u) ? vars(w(f )). By construction of ? and ?, w?? = w? ? implies that for all x ? vars(w(f )), x?? = x? ? and so u?? = u? ? . We do a similar proof to show that for

. Lastly, and img(?) ? (vars(w) ? vars(IPC(S))) = ? directly allows us to conclude that ? completes (w, ? )

N. Base-case and . |dom, |: In such a case, since vars(?) ? vars(IPC(S))?vars(w), we deduce that vars(img

?. Moreover, We first show (w, ?) is maximal 1. (w 0 , ?) is maximal for ? in S. 2. w = w 0 ?? 3. for all x ? dom(?) vars(w 0 ), vars(x?) ? vars(t 1 , . . . , t n ). 4. for all x ? dom(?) ? vars(w 0 ), x? ? X , x? ? vars(t, t 1 , . . . , t n ) and x? occurs only once in w. 5. for all x ? dom(?), x? ? X implies that either x? ? st(t 1 , . . . , t n ) or there exists T such that k w (T, x?) ? k w1 (X 1 , t 1 ), . . . , k wn (X n , t n ) ? conseq

R. Rename, ?. {1, and .. .. , We prove the result on g with (w 0 , ?) and ?. By hypothesis on f , we know that g verifies properties 1 and 2. Moreover, since t i = t j , we also know that vars(t 1 Therefore, g verifies properties 3 and 4. Let x ? dom(?) such that x? ? X . By hypothesis on f , we know that either x? ? st(t 1 , . . . , t n ) or there exists T such that k w (T, x?) ? k w1 (X 1 , t 1 ), . . . , k wn (X n , t n ) ? conseq(K solved ), the former case, we directly have that x? ? st(t 1 , . . . , t j?1 , t j+1 , . . . , t n ) since t i = t j . In the later case, a simple induction on the number of rules applied 3. there exist y ? dom(?) and r ? st(y?) such that r? = x? and y? ? X : By Property f.5, we know that either y? ? st(t 1 , . . . , t n ) or there exists T such that k w (T, y?) ? k w1 (X 1 , t 1 ), . . . , k wn (X n , t n ) ? conseq, pp.1-1

?. {1, ?. {1, .. .. , ?. {1, and ?. {1, n}. By Property f.6.a, we have for all , n}, t i is well formed in f w.r.t. (w 0 , ?) and ?. Hence, there exists u 1 , . . . , u k ? st IS (S, ? 0 ), i 1 , n} and a context C built on function symbols such that t i0 = C[t i1, C, there exists T such that k w (T, t i0 | p ) ? k w1 (X 1 , t 1 ), . . . , k wn (X n , t n ) ? conseq
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/in2p3-00522368

?. {1, .. .. , ?. {1, and ?. {1, n}, t i is well formed in f w.r.t. (w 0 , ?) and ? (Prop f.6.a), we obtain that there exist u 1 , . . . , u k ? st IS (S, ? 0 ), i 1 , n} and a context C built on function symbols such that y? = C[t i1, C, there exists T such that k w (T, y?| p ) ? k w1 (X 1 , t 1 ), . . . , k wn (X n , t n ) ? conseq

. .. There-exist-y-?-dom, ? st(y? ) such that r? = x? and y? ? X : ? If the Reachability test fails, we have that r l1,...,ln ? {k wi (X i , x i )} i?{1, we have that there exists T , ? such that

M. , .. .. Mn, and =. =====-?, T , ?) we have (R? = R ?)?. By Theorem 3, we have however that that there exists T , ? such that

=. Li, and (R = R )? i and 1. either for all U ? P, V we have