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Safely composing security protocols

Véronique Cortier 1 Jérémie Delaitre 1 Stéphanie Delaune 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : Security protocols are small programs that are executed in hostile environments. Many results and tools have been developed to formally analyze the security of a protocol in the presence of active attackers that may block, intercept and send new messages. However even when a protocol has been proved secure, there is absolutely no guarantee if the protocol is executed in an environment where other protocols, possibly sharing some common identities and keys like public keys or long-term symmetric keys, are executed. In this paper, we show that security of protocols can be easily composed. More precisely, we show that whenever a protocol is secure, it remains secure even in an environment where arbitrary protocols are executed, provided each encryption contains some tag identifying each protocol, like e.g. the name of the protocol.
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Submitted on : Thursday, June 28, 2007 - 10:03:34 AM
Last modification on : Friday, January 21, 2022 - 3:09:07 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, September 21, 2010 - 1:35:55 PM


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  • HAL Id : inria-00157889, version 2


Véronique Cortier, Jérémie Delaitre, Stéphanie Delaune. Safely composing security protocols. [Research Report] RR-6234, INRIA. 2007, pp.26. ⟨inria-00157889v2⟩



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