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Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience

Abstract : Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper of responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function of perception is fulfilled by perceptual beliefs. I develop this claim by showing that the doxastic account satisfies a series of intuitive requirements of justification and belief revision.
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Contributor : Santiago Echeverri Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 4:45:42 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 17, 2021 - 12:29:12 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, June 18, 2010 - 5:21:06 PM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00452608, version 1



Santiago Echeverri. Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience. G. W. Bertram, R. Celikates, C. Laudou & D. Lauer. Expérience et réflexivité: perspectives au-delà de l'empirisme et de l'idéalisme, Éditions L'Harmattan, 14p, 2010. ⟨ijn_00452608⟩



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