The content of intentions

Elisabeth Pacherie (1)

1 IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod

By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior intentions and intentions in action.

Mots clés: Intentions; action; motor representations; self-referentiality

Elisabeth Pacherie. The content of intentions. Mind & Language, 2000, 15 (4), pp.400-432. ⟨ijn_00000258v2⟩