Fiscal Capacity and Dualism in Colonial States : The French Empire 1830-1962

Denis Cogneau (1, 2, 3) , Yannick Dupraz (4) , Sandrine Mesplé-Somps (5, 6, 1)

1 IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement
2 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 University of Warwick [Coventry]
5 DIAL - Développement, institutions et analyses de long terme
6 PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

To provide comparative evidence on the states of the second French colonial empire (1830-1962), we build a new database, unprecedented in detail, and in geographical and historical scope. The data reveal that the French colonies had high extractive efficiency, but low productive efficiency. Colonial states taxed extensively, adapting fiscal tools to varying economic contexts and historical conditions, but they achieved little because public expenditures entailed high wage costs for expatriate civil servants, and exhibited a bias toward needs of French settlers and capitalists. Socioeconomic and political dualism emerges as a common colonial inheritance.

Domaines: Economies et finances

Denis Cogneau, Yannick Dupraz, Sandrine Mesplé-Somps. Fiscal Capacity and Dualism in Colonial States : The French Empire 1830-1962. 2019. ⟨halshs-01818700v3⟩